Shaleen Anand – Patna
You can also publish your article on our Journal ( Send your article at this Mail – joidconsultancy@gmail.com /Ph – 8617562543 WA-7584931893 )
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), born in 1964 after the split from the CPI, emerged as a formidable political force in West Bengal, Kerala, and Tripura. Yet, despite Bihar’s agrarian inequalities, social unrest, and history of peasant mobilizations, the CPM never managed to establish itself as a significant player in the state’s political spectrum. Its failure can be explained through a mix of structural, ideological, and electoral factors.
Legacy of Division within the Left:
At the time of the split, the CPI already had deep organizational roots in Bihar, particularly in trade unions and among sections of the peasantry. The formation of CPM created a parallel structure rather than a united front, dividing cadre strength and confusing the voter base. Unlike in Bengal or Kerala, where CPM displaced the CPI as the dominant left force, in Bihar the CPI managed to retain its primacy, especially in districts like Begusarai, Madhubani, Bhojpur, and Patna rural belt.
Caste vs. Class Contradictions:
Bihar’s politics has historically been shaped by caste cleavages more than pure class conflict. The CPM, with its rigid class-oriented lens, struggled to integrate caste questions into its framework. The rise of backward-caste politics after the 1970s, culminating in the Mandal Commission implementation in 1990, further alienated CPM from the emerging political discourse. By contrast, parties like RJD, Samta Party and JD(U) built powerful caste-based coalitions, while CPI(ML) mobilized Dalits and landless laborers more effectively than CPM ever could.
Organizational Weakness:
25th State convention of CPM in Bihar
Unlike in West Bengal, where CPM built a disciplined cadre base through Kisan Sabhas, trade unions, Youth front (DYFI) and student organizations (SFI), in Bihar its organizational penetration remained weak and scattered. The party contested elections regularly but without mass movements to sustain its presence. For instance, in the 1980 Bihar Assembly elections, CPM contested 67 seats but won only 6. In the 1990s and 2000s, its electoral fortunes declined further, with vote shares rarely crossing 1–2%. Its presence became symbolic, limited to small pockets like Katihar or Purnia.
Neglect by Central Leadership:
The CPM’s central leadership remained heavily focused on West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, treating Bihar as a peripheral state. This neglect meant lack of strategic investment in cadre building, leadership grooming, and issue-based mobilization. As a result, the party could not compete with CPI(ML)’s aggressive grassroots approach or the CPI’s traditional networks.
Changing Political Landscape after 1990:
The post Mandal Kamandal phase marked a structural decline for Left politics in Bihar. The social justice plank of Lalu Prasad Yadav RJD and the subsequent consolidation of backward castes under JD(U) captured the very constituency that Left parties aimed to mobilize. Simultaneously, the BJP expanded through Hindutva and Upper Caste outreach, leaving CPM squeezed between caste-based and religious-political mobilizations.
Electoral Marginalization in the 21st Century:
By the 2000s, CPM had almost vanished from Bihar’s legislative map. In the 2015 Assembly elections, CPM contested 43 seats but won none, securing barely 0.61% of votes statewide. Even within the Left Front, CPI(ML) Liberation emerged as the dominant player with three seat and vote share of 1.54%, particularly in central Bihar’s agrarian belts, reducing CPM to irrelevance.
Conclusion:
The CPM’s inability to expand in Bihar reflects both structural limitations and strategic failures. Its neglect of caste realities, weak organizational penetration, factional competition with CPI and CPI(ML), and overdependence on central leadership led to long-term marginalization. Bihar presented fertile ground for left politics, but while CPI retained legacy bases and CPI(ML) reinvented itself through militant struggles, CPM remained trapped in ideological rigidity and electoral underperformance.
The lesson is clear: ideological purity without political adaptability cannot sustain a party in a state where caste, identity, and populist politics define mass mobilization.
Our other articles : The Decline of CPI in Bihar Politics: From Vanguard to the Margins | The Quad As An Asian NATO | 100 Best Books of the 21st Century by The New York Times | How Bihar’s SIR Revision Threatens Congress’s Chances in Its Mission 58| From Sushasan Babu to Survival Babu | PK’s 2030 Gameplan | Does Bengal Have a PR Problem? | A scenario of “What ifs” in Bihar | German Chancellor Fellowship discussion |Mission 58: How Congress Plans to Flip Bihar | Bengal Bellwether – 2 | Bengal Bellwether – 1 | India United – India’s message is loud & clear on terrorism a diplomatic strike on terror| The Indian Stock Market is bleeding | SUPER NARI – 25 | Caste and the Ballot in Bihar | The suicidal mission of Pakistan’s so called ‘Establishment’ | Who is Responsible for Bihar’s Migration Crisis? | Why Congress must go solo in Bihar | Jai Bhim | Old is Gold , Resurrection of ‘Dynasty Politics’ | China Faces 125% Tariff by USA: A Strategic Opportunity for India | When the Accuser Becomes the Accused
Books that enriches – Westbengal Changing Colours Chnaging Challenges by Sitaram Sharma | India after Gandhi by Ramchandra Guha | Contesting democratic deficit by Salman Khurshid | The election that surprised India By Rajdeep Sardesai
Er. Shaleen Anand is a Political Analyst and Academician. He has worked with renowned political strategists Mr. Prashant Kishor and Chief Strategist of INC Mr. Sunil Kanugolu, and has also served as an Assistant Professor at a private university.